



## Introduction – The cultural contradictions of the “information society”

The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) is a process whose results will be evaluated in the courts of history, but it produced a little wrinkle in time for those who participated in it. A double-barrelled forum that lasted over four years (2001-2005), it opened the Millennium symbolically as well as chronologically and was a formative experience for most participants. In fact, its official closure did not finalise the issues that it opened for debate, leading the way to a complex process of implementation with 10 action lines and a forum dedicated to the governance of the Internet (IGF). The after-effect has left people grappling with solutions for implementation as the process revealed the inherent cultural contradictions of the information society.

Daniel Bell, who wrote the *Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* in 1970, also grappled with such a challenge. He explored then how the West went from an economy of production to an economy of consumption, via the use of culture, as a quest for “a new sensibility” to create a new “underlying social structure”. Since 2001, there has been a need to re-evaluate the evolution of our cultural contradictions, as the West has moved from an economy of consumption to an economy of participation, also via a new use of culture, promoted by ICT-driven media. But participation cannot be reduced to the liberal-technical mantra of self-expression that promotes individual impulse over shared construction of culture. Culture as a construct still consists of the human efforts to provide a coherent set of answers to our predicaments in real life. That this culture is increasingly mediated by a variety of media is the new transformative situation that increases the number of contradictions rather than diminishes them. But this shouldn't prevent us from trying to make sense of the social and ethical dilemmas that engage us with the media.

Bell explored how society's culture of consumption conflicted with the mindset required for production, and how this presented a problem. He insisted on the economic principle of rationality

defined in terms of efficiency in the allocation of resources, and contrasted it to culture “dominated by an antirational, anti-intellectual temper”. The identity structure inherited from the 19th century – with its emphasis on self-discipline, delayed gratification, restraint – was still relevant to the demands of the social structure but it clashed sharply with the culture of consumption, where such values had been rejected. Paradoxically, the workings of the capitalist system itself contributed to the clash, as consumption both requires novelty and equalises any new proposal by blending it to the larger market offer.

The current situation, inherited from the past, is also conflicted, as the mindset required for consumption clashes with the mindset for participation. The information-society master narrative tries to solve these contradictions in its own way. A new social structure is in the making that requires its own worldview and is still tinted by the old one, which makes future directions difficult to see. Individuals are refusing to be dissolved into their labour roles and functions. They are aware that such behavioural regulation may hurt their wider perception of their own good and society's good. The tensions between consumption and participation are framing the social and legal conflicts today, with ICT-driven media at the core. Such tensions run through many issues, such as identity, dignity, privacy, diversity ... “soft” issues indeed, but issues that are central to people's perception of well-being and feeling of empowerment.

Media are not much part of the equation with Daniel Bell. And yet they are too prominent to be ignored any more, to understand the different facts of the transition in mindsets. Moving from the economy of consumption to the economy of participation is possible only through them, as the third industrial revolution fully relies on the information paradigm. This move is not based on an exclusively rational view of mankind but on a cognitive one that associates emotions, actions, reasons and values, as a new sensibility that modifies the social structure. This new analysis of the current situation requires to take into account both the perils and promises of the media environment, with an array of solutions for action (regulation, co-regulation, multi-stakeholderism), which affects the legal system as well, with bottom-up innovations.

Media in culture have participated in the current tensions: they are part of a non-religious set that propels personal experience and hedonism, exploration of creativity under all forms (including the destructive), elimination of physical and psychic distance in favour of immediacy and simultaneity, expressivity and reflexivity. The media per se have become the focus of attention, to

the point that the distinctions between reality and virtuality are increasingly blurred. How to find social norms and values for conduct in this creatively constructed incoherence?

At the end of the 1990s, as the ICT-driven media crystallised around the new vehicle called the Internet, the consequences of virtuality on real-life situations started touching people in their everyday experience. Turning everything into a commodity, including representations, did not prove altogether satisfactory for self-fulfilment and well-being; the larger environment was also setting some inescapable constraints, with climate changes and terror threats. Contemporary culture has reached some limits, as Daniel Bell would say: "a limit to growth, a limit to the spoliation of the environment, a limit to arms, a limit to tampering with biological nature". Our 21st century will have to learn to deal with these limits in economy and security and will probably try to compensate them with media: digital solutions are supposed to be cleaner for the environment, if not totally safe. Media will also allow us access to simulated worlds of fantasy that will not have negative effects on nature. The potential is there but our hubris, after having feasted on notions of constant change and unlimited progress, might have difficulties in adjusting to such limits.

In his afterword of 1996, Bell added to his analysis "the separation of law from morality" but forgot to add that it was replaced with a link between law and human rights, as individual rights that have incidence on the private and public conduct of individuals, in a non-religious context. He mentioned, however, the prevalence of property rights, be it of shareholders and stakeholders, and definitely, property has become the source of most tensions and contradictions in the information society, all the more so as the economic contradictions of Soviet communism have come to an end and taken away the dream of collectively shared means of production.

One of the dominant questions for regulating authorities dealing with participation is how to establish the boundaries for participatory behaviour, in economics as well as in culture. What is going to be the way of life of societies led by the information paradigm? There seems to be a drastic change of attitude already, as the primacy of virtual spectacles and services takes over the social sphere of work, leisure, health, etc. The postmodernist tendency to refuse delayed gratification and the discipline of frugality seems to be extended over to the virtual world, where a curious inversion is taking place as leisure activities are being turned into unpaid labour in the timeless flow of social networks and creative industries.

In this book, "information society" is an expression taken as a kind of heuristic device, an "ideal type", not drawn from mere history or description of one case alone. It is a construct that is useful to contrast with other, previous constructs, such as "Protestant ethic", or "spirit of capitalism". The alternative term, often put forward by civil society during the WSIS, is "knowledge societies", but somehow it has not dominated the media discourse or grabbed the public imagination as the master narrative of our times. Knowledge societies seem to be in the horizon of potentials to be derived from the advent of the information paradigm. If husbanded properly, it is to be hoped and expected that information will yield knowledge. But there is no clear certainty about it, and information might lead to nothing but itself if data mining follows its own economic logic. Adding knowledge to the equation shades it with cultural and social dimensions but without a guarantee of a harmonious realisation. One of the cultural contradictions of the information society is indeed the potential hiatus between information and knowledge, if the gap between the two is not bridged by media cultures.

In the early 21st century, after modernism and postmodernism, we are looking for a common frame for making sense of our surrounding environment that can embrace all dimensions of the economy and society in the third industrial revolution. This common frame is cyberism, i.e. the shift from Web 1.0 to Web 2.0, characterised by a move from a centralised technology that allowed for little participation and interaction, around e-mails and blogs, to a decentralised network of speedy broadband applications, browsers and social platforms, around Google, Youtube, Facebook and Twitter. In contrast to the Web 1.0 client-server model, where providers supplied tethered applications to consumers, Web 2.0 uses distributed network architecture via peer-to-peer coordination (P2P) and shared resources (such as disk storage or network bandwidth) for users who are both suppliers and consumers of information. In this information paradigm shift, from the post modernist era to the cyberist era, the online behavior of the end-users, as they become contributors and producers of information, takes primacy over their offline activities and develops a tighter than ever co-evolution between man and the machine. These cyberist features tend to displace the concerns of the late modernity to the margins while other concerns come to the fore.

Pushing further away from Bell while using some of his notions, there seem to be three characteristics to follow in the cultural contradictions of the information society, as it unfolds in the cyberist moment, beyond its immediate origins (the 1980s-1990s):

the double bind of the information society (between consumption and participation); the termination of the legacy of modernism/postmodernism; and the contradictions of the ideological supremacy of capitalism.

1) The double bind of the information society is due to the fact that information is still construed as a continuation of consumption (data collections can be sold, as with DoubleClick) but is also seen as a tool for participation (data can be gathered collectively, as with Wikipedia). In itself, information as consumption is being endangered by spam and all kinds of noise in the media and communication services. The sober and controlled version of data mining is being challenged by the intrusive and impulsive expressions of social networks. The revolution of the participatory culture is aided by technological innovations like “open source” that challenge and complement proprietary platforms that act like free ones (Facebook, Twitter). Social justice seems more accessible, though it is predicated on access to expensive systems; boundaries of ownership and property are being shifted, though it is not clear, to the ordinary participant, who owns the Internet in this seamless illusion of a global village without borders. Industrial developers are no longer sure that information as it was constructed in its origins is still the control system of the economy, as it is challenged by creative users and their chaotic communication habits.

2) The termination of the postmodernist cultural paradigm is in tension with the premises of the cyberist paradigm, as its emerging trends are still being redefined by residual modernist filters. What Bell calls the “eclipse of distance” is continued further with what could be called the “advent of multiple presences”, as ICT-driven media create simulated situations and virtual worlds. The reduction of physical, social and psychic distance is pushed further by proximity and immediacy. Proximity and immediacy, seen as favourable democratic trends, can be traced in the exploration of selves within the self, thanks to pseudonyms, avatars and cyborgs, in virtual territories. The postmodernist era embraced fragmentation and the dissolution of ego. The Internet and its wheels of webs in many ways reflects this postmodernist view, but it is reaching a stage where, within its own information paradigm, it is also shaping a co-dependency between man and the machine, that dissolves the self to build a collective agency carried on by technological codes as much as human nodes.

For Frederic Jameson, Douglas Kellner and other post-Marxist observers, postmodernism is a new phase of capitalism, where all spheres of privacy and society have been invaded by commodification. For sociologists like Luc Boltanski, Eve Chiapello or Scott

Lash, there is an open conflict between the established industrial bourgeoisie and the new post-industrial one that doesn't want to pay allegiance to the old one. With the rise of the new "spirit of capitalism" within the information society, there is yet another class challenging the post-industrial one, which Mike Featherstone, following Pierre Bourdieu, calls the "new cultural intermediaries", information brokers and workers who push for wider transformation of labour and leisure relations, disrupting the standard cultural credentials in the process. Their claims for community-based self-supporting systems for culturally appropriate practices tend to offset legal and institutional mechanisms that cause overly-restrictive and corporate-dominated commercial distortions (like Intellectual Property laws).

Cyberism is aware of the risk of losing all the positive acquisitions of modernity (democracy, public sphere, media freedom) as a disjuncture in history could bring back an anti-modern, conservative ideology, with authoritarian tendencies, especially if participation is equated to mob instincts and lawlessness on the new virtual frontiers. And yet cyberism can push further the democratic thrust if direct participation is channelled in innovative solutions for global problems. Collaborative humans, working for mutual benefits, can strive for an open-ended process of expanding exchanges of intelligence. Responsiveness, connectedness, co-regulation and governance, such are the new keywords attached to the political dimension of the information paradigm in the making.

3) The contradictions in the ideological supremacy of capitalism relate to the fact that capitalism tends to present itself as a non-ideology, just a neutral vector of economy when, in fact, it requires huge political mobilisation to protect and promote the market. The global economy implies new roles for governments and new actors that are non-governmental, be it in business or in civil society. Bell, not unlike Ulrich Beck, makes a useful distinction between "international" and "global": international still relates to the modernist view of division of labour between raw materials and production; global is a single market, crossing boundaries for production, skilled labour, etc.

The emerging cyberist trend is "cosmopolitical", as communication and information technologies enhance key media services and make boundaries as fungible as the interactions among people. The global village does not just sprout from the Internet's roots: its reticular growth springs from the meshing together of all kinds of networks, be they television, cable, satellite, fibre optics, or bandwidth. These networks are not neutral, as they disseminate all sorts of contents, mostly those favouring individualism and

consumerism as in the modernist view, but also some favouring shared and aggregated goods and services as a harbinger of cyberism.

Fragmentation seems to remain the main trend, in a more controlled manner than in postmodernism, with alluring visions of personal amateur cultures as alternatives to big corporations' blockbuster productions. If fragmentation prevents the risk of homogenisation, it presents the reverse risk of flattening meaning by having each idea cancel its opposite. And yet not all ideas are equal, some being more damaging than others, in the same way as amateur activity does not necessarily percolate into artistic quality or professional competence. The cyberist moment is poised in between systems, where means of popular selection may balance media elites, while recognising that diversity shouldn't lead to disorientation.

The advent of new scientific paradigms also coincides with the cyberist moment, as cognition and its social and bio-cultural extrapolations provide new complex interpretations of human nature and culture. Mind theory is key in cyberspace, with a focus on the knower and the constructs that he or she can elaborate in multiple perspectives, including simulated ones. Means of knowing have grown uncertain in postmodernism and it is a heritage that is being carried into the new cyberist perspective of open cognition. Yet, cyberism is not as negative and dissipative as postmodernism and tries to depart from it, with alternative foundations based on constructivism and interactionism. If information is to lead to sense-making knowledge, it needs to do so in interaction with the environment, in the use of media for determining the nature of what is represented and transmitted, keeping in mind social negotiation of meaning and the advent of multiple presences.

So, when dealing with these contradictions, how to proceed nonetheless, in spite of it all? How to infuse a humanist dimension in this cyberist perspective that doesn't pretend to destroy the contradictions but that tries to displace them so as to respond to the new demands of people for social justice? How to establish a new social contract, where all the actors will share the same vision and accept to be accountable for it, in a global system?

The cyberist task could be, à la Jürgen Habermas, to engage in "communicative action", to encourage "all forms of dissensus" à la Jean-François Lyotard, or to repurpose "consummately generative events" à la Jonathan Zittrain. These are not mutually exclusive, but the system that will allow them to cohabit and commingle requires the plasticity of a "cosmopolitical realism" à la Beck, as non-linear

and cross-border forms of international exchanges of information generate new ways of harnessing the benefits of such disruptive media technologies.

Governments may find themselves as arbitrators of such tasks, trying to keep a balance between the need for public connectedness and the drive for private business, to avoid some of the 20th century's dehumanising consequences of ICT dominance. But nation states are no longer the only actors, as a new system of transnational governance is emerging whose project is the soft integration of the ICT-driven media sector in all the spheres of culture and economy. The soft law mechanisms of such governance, which favour resolution of disputes over sanctions, are closely related to the cognitive paradigms of distributed intelligence over the networks. They require a multi-stakeholder approach to the cyberist task, calling on public/private/civic partnership – a task that is not without risks of capture of one entity by another, but that has the merit of displacing by inclusion. The addition of a new constituency, civil society, that has been ascertaining its credibility beyond the grassroots level during the chaotic postmodernist period, also characterises the cyberist moment.

The contradictions of the information society are first and foremost those exhibited by people in their daily lives. Such incongruities of attitude may be taken as the cultural dynamic way in which citizens try to maintain a balance between tensions that risk pulling them apart amid today's virtual tectonics. This process of equilibration is per se part of the human adventure of being a civilisation of 6 billion inhabitants. Striking the right cognitive balance means measuring risks, taking decisions and evaluating the amount of control one has over a given situation. Public perceptions of risk are related to uncertainty and reversibility (or the lack thereof) but also to familiarity and to exposure to alternative solutions. Information-based cultures try to balance decision and risk, taking in the advantages and limitations of the various options offered. As some people ask themselves, rightly, "Who controls the Internet?", others just go about generating stuff on it.

This balancing act implies having a theory of culture, not just of economics or of politics – and, within it, a theory of media within culture. Taking communicative agency at the core, and using social cognition to model the transmission of ideas on the transmission of neural networks, such an approach applies mind theory to draw parallelisms between the social reproduction of culture and the biological reproduction of our cells. The information paradigm in this equation adds the idea that media mimic these mechanisms in the reproduction of data in the digital age: media are constructed

as externalisations of neural networks and internalisations of cultural and natural signals.

In this cyberist view, all media are cognitive artefacts, unified by our human capacity for representation to enable us to monitor the environment and treat information, our two main cognitive needs for problem solving, and what ultimately justifies and legitimates our constant generation of media. The Internet arrives at the current moment of the evolutionary chain of media to fulfil the cyberist need for understanding the global scale of our interactions with nature. This is not to deny the radical changes or specific contributions of each media before, all of which are still present and dynamic, but to remind us that they follow social and cultural uses, not ruled by our rational economic needs only. The issues of human interest remain key to our understanding, and they are open-ended, generative and prone to alternate mood swings of dissensus and consensus. Even when they take the virtual reality detour, media keep us deeply grounded in our core desires.

Such a theory of media in culture is built on a vision of humanity that resembles a set of nested Russian dolls, with multiple scales of life, from the global sphere to the local community, offline and online, where our dynamic self engages with our core desires for identity and justice. It can't accept the idea that capitalism as a mode of production generates culture as an epiphenomenon of its consumptive activities. In the same way as the failures of the liberal economy recently have recalled that politics are necessary, not just to set order but to provide thrust and trust, the economy would fail if ideas and art did not circulate in spite of the market. The "@" is a sign of a networked culture well beyond technical addressing and economic mailing.

Media cultures have come to dominate the cyberist moment, especially as they encourage the socialisation of young people on the digital networks. Finding the right scale of interaction that binds people together, beyond the contractual nature of economic exchanges, is the current challenge to ensure well-being and self-fulfilment online and offline. While the market works on niches and fragmented productions that, at best, compile a series of roles into a self, culture ensures that identity emerges from the fluid integration of dignity and privacy to ensure the viable nesting of the multiple scales of self into the right fit.

This cyberist moment coincides with demands for rights that enforce dissensus, the politics of difference through egalitarian virtue. It reaches its maturity at the same time as the universal human rights movement that recently celebrated its 60th anniversary.

The conjunction of such rights with digital convergence presents the potential structure for social peace online and offline. Such conjunction arrives at the historical moment in which the transition can be made from a politicised view of rights to a cultural one, as exemplified by the invention of the right to cultural diversity over the last decade, a right that anchors all forms of expression and representation in the territorialisation of media.

In their recent history, universal human rights have been criticised by some for being neo-colonialist, by others for being condescending and by others still for being vehicles of Western soft power interference to keep underdeveloped countries in check. In the cyberist moment, they can become a viable alternative to capitalism, as a part of the liberal heritage of the late modernity. In spite of renewed tensions around the double standard feeling that the human rights are a Western production that the West applies to itself but not to the rest of the world, the culture of rights needs to go beyond ideology and move towards generativity and plasticity, not as a new relativism in rights but as the capacity to turn such rights and principles into collective bargaining tools.

The forms of global governance to move to the implementation of such rights into real political structures need all actors to work in collaborative partnership, however imperfectly making them circulate globally, whatever the degree of authoritarianism or liberalism of the country. For this circulation, there is no room for a double standard of rights or for a two-tiered citizenship of rights. The contribution of civil society actors in the displacement of cultural contradictions resides in this renewed thrust to establish these universal human rights as “boundaries” to transgression, as Bell says, so as to make us move forward as people in a global village.

Cognitive boundaries to transgression exist, and media can be seen as ways to engage with them. A cognitive use of media in culture is lodged in the ethics of dissensus that embraces the cultural contradictions generated by the core of our human desires and negotiates viable politics of difference that can be acceptable to the majority. This implies providing the means for citizens to be active and empowered, to ensure that basic freedoms and identity issues are accessible and open, without trying to capture them in one direction or another. Citizenship is an outcome and an output of dignity, so self-respect and self-esteem should meet with respect and esteem of others, in our mediated cultures.

This book was written with these considerations in mind, giving them meaning from the perspective of research, placing the

researcher in a balancing act between civil society, public affairs and private interests. It was also primarily set in the context of the Council of Europe, where my expertise as a specialist in uses and regulations of media, stemming from work on harmful content, co-regulation and media education, was confronted with the expertise of legal minds, trying to translate sociological trends into media policies within the human rights framework. A shared experience of full participation in the WSIS and a shared worldview of balancing protective with participatory approaches allowed for mutual understanding and fruitful co-operation. But co-operation doesn't rule out independence in the expertise, maintained by a careful focus on each specific project and a calculated distance from the legal orbit. Experts are necessary in a multi-stakeholder perspective and in soft governance projects, but they need to be valued for what they bring, not for the final outcome of their contribution, which will be negotiated by other stakeholders.

The aspects of information society and digital culture addressed in the 10 chapters explore the pros and cons of an issue that creates dissensus, without excess of hype, considering the implications for the different actors involved. These "soft" issues concern the non-technical perimeter of ICT-driven media that are yet crucial for the resolution of our cultural desires and the right scale of our interactions. They each encapsulate some dimension of the cultural contradictions of the cyberist moment, and tend to go in pairs, such as ethics and dignity, identity and privacy, diversity and public value, risk of harm and gatekeeping. Two issues frame the book: media definitions because their contested perimeter needs to be ascertained and media education that purports to bring long-term solutions. The first and last chapters thus complete the arc of these concerns.

The different chapters deliberately focus on the social and cognitive value of media to society, to avoid the techno discourse. The cultural importance of the activities that media facilitate is considered from the perspective of networked users, in a pluralistic and contextual manner. Using specific public issues as a way to address the cultural contradictions of the information society, each chapter contributes to a general taxonomy of such tensions and dissensions. The whole yields a framework for understanding its pluralistic dimensions, by addressing what impinges upon the construction of knowledge. The role of media in problem creating and, hopefully, problem solving is examined each time. What emerges in the end is the proposal of a theory of media within culture, in an ongoing evolutionary process of making human rights evolve and adapt to the demands of their times. The organic and dynamic

nature of this body of principles and ethical practices is ultimately framed in a model for the “amplification of governance” in the cyberist moment.

In its nature, the book comes out of a collection of reports or background papers written for the Council of Europe, more specifically the section of media in the Human Rights Directorate. Most of the texts presented have been delivered in Strasbourg, after the WSIS. They are based on actual personal research but their final format has often evolved due to negotiated visions, either through full-fledged seminars or conferences organised by the Council of Europe to elicit multiple perspectives from a variety of actors. This doesn't mean that they express consensual visions. They actually tend to maintain the liveliness of the cultural contradictions of the information society, as part of the ethics of dissensus and the politics of difference.

These working documents have been edited to remove heavy descriptions of the frameworks and procedures used but they try to maintain their original impetus. The recommendations by the Council of Europe with which they reverberate are listed in the appendix. The text and argument have been significantly reworked to provide for a global narrative thread, and to address a larger public than the legal minds at work in the initial context. Each chapter follows a relatively similar pattern, to establish references between them: an initial assessment of the challenges within an issue, the perspective from social cognition and generative media, then some strategies and examples of what works, considered not so much as good practices as sense-making practices, and finally recommendations to all actors on how to foster solutions in the cultural contradictions of the information society. These recommendations are always addressed to all public–private–civic entities involved, in a multi-stakeholder perspective. They are open-ended and generative themselves, as contributions to the ongoing conversation on the future of media.

But the rewriting of these documents for the Council of Europe has been an opportunity to clarify the theory of media within culture in order to identify the challenges of the information society. There is a relative progression from chapter to chapter from the first chapter on definitions to the last one on education, with human rights as the backbone. As a result, a certain degree of redundancy is embedded in the book, to ensure that ideas are built around a coherent rationale, and that this coherent rationale can be applied to the various issues under consideration. Hence the decision to maintain the list of recommendations at the end of each chapter,

for various publics to seize on them and apply them to their own needs and situations, by whichever entry level is most adequate.

Recommendations are not a mere laundry list or a naive collection of wishful thoughts. Most of them are already under way, in different forms of advancement, carried by different actors in a variety of forums. Having them all together, within the framework developed through each chapter, shows how generative they are, how connected and coherent they can be, so as to provide a rationale for whoever among the stakeholders wants to appropriate one or any of them for his or her own constituency to promote and carry through. One of the empowering lessons of multi-stakeholderism, as developed in international forums like the WSIS and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), is that their secondary effects are powerful and unpredictable, especially when people can bring home ideas and solutions with the comfort that they are not alone in thinking along the same lines.

The Council of Europe is not responsible for these ideas, though a lot of them have been exchanged within its precincts. The Council of Europe is one of the most active stakeholders in bringing back to its human rights home the action lines and the spirit of global governance developed in the WSIS and the IGF, often extending it beyond its own region to reach out to other regions, in typical cyberist, cosmopolitical style. The Council of Europe also tries to negotiate those conflicting media matters and re-interpret them within the framework of human rights. It has become, arguably, a multi-stakeholder platform for meta policy standards and practices, not so much intent on decision making as on decision shaping, via soft recommendations rather than hard law.

In so doing, it echoes a question that many ask themselves in the cyberist moment: "How to 'regulate' under conditions of uncertainty?" The generative answer, à la Zittrain, is to consider law as a generative process too, and as a result, to procrastinate! Legal and social decisions should not be taken prematurely, but approximated with suggestions and negotiations. Where moral suasion fails, only then should legal decision kick in. Hence the interest in cases of digital dissensus that have reached the mainstream, now that the Internet has attained its maturity, now that the offline consequences of online actions are becoming visible and strident, now that virtuality is being re-territorialised into reality, now that uses and abuses call for social justice and human rights. Mainstream impact is what we are dealing with in the cyberist moment, and it is no longer technical code but ethical values that should apply, with the help of distributed judgments emanating from our human collaborative intelligence.